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Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1547 (2004) and 1574 (2004), in which the Council requested me to submit, as soon as possible after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, recommendations for the size, structure and mandate of a United Nations operation that would be established in support of the implementation of the Agreement; and resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1564 (2004), in which the Council requested me to incorporate into the mission contingency planning for the Darfur region, to assist the African Union with planning and assessments for its mission in Darfur, to take appropriate steps to increase the number of human rights monitors deployed to Darfur and, in accordance with the joint communiqué of 3 July 2004 (S/2004/635, annex), to prepare to support the implementation of a future agreement in Darfur in close cooperation with the African Union.

2. In a historic display of wisdom after decades of devastating conflict, the Government of the Sudan, represented by Vice-President Ali Osman Taha, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), represented by Chairman John Garang, signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement on 9 January 2005, two and a half years after the first protocol was signed at Machakos, Kenya. The signing ceremony was attended by several African Heads of State and Government, my Special Representative for the Sudan, my Special Adviser on Africa and other dignitaries.

3. While both parties are to be congratulated for this act of statesmanship, particular appreciation must go to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) for its mediation, the Government of Kenya and external sponsors who have worked tirelessly to bring the peace talks to a successful conclusion and many of whom provided generous financial contributions to the lengthy negotiation process. I would like to publicly recognize this exemplary case of African leadership. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signals the parties' willingness to put an end to one of Africa's longest and most intractable wars, during which more than 2 million people were killed, 4 million were uprooted and some 600,000 were forced to seek shelter beyond the Sudan's borders as refugees.

4. The present report includes an update of the work that the United Nations advance mission has carried out in the Sudan following its establishment in August 2004, a description of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and a discussion of

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political and humanitarian considerations as implementation proceeds. In my report of 3 June 2004 (S/2004/453), I began to chart the scale of work to be carried out by the United Nations and the international community if we are to successfully assist the parties in the years ahead. I also outlined my recommendations on the role the United Nations can play to assist the parties in implementing their agreement and consolidating peace, as well as the crucial support required within the region and from the wider international community throughout the long implementation period to come.

II. United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan

A. Preparations to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

5. In the light of the progress made at the IGAD-led talks in the first months of 2004, the Security Council, on my recommendation, mandated in its resolution 1547 (2004) a special political mission to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of a peace support operation following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. On the basis of that resolution, the United Nations has established a special political mission, the United Nations Advance Mission in the Sudan (UNAMIS).

6. My Special Representative, Jan Pronk, who assumed his functions as head of mission on 1 August 2004, has also been leading the United Nations peacemaking effort in support of IGAD and the African Union-mediated talks on Darfur. UNAMIS officials have been providing assistance to both processes and a United Nations multidisciplinary team was assigned to the final stages of the peace talks in Naivasha, Kenya, to provide support and to ensure complementarities between the outcome of the negotiations and preparations for an expanded operation in the Sudan.

7. In addition, my Special Representative has worked along with the United Nations country team to develop a unified structure to ensure that the United Nations is in the best position to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Mission's administration and support element has focused on developing and refining operational plans on the ground, as well as preparing for the deployment of military and civilian personnel and providing effective forward support to the Mission.

8. On 5 August 2004, the Government signed a status of mission agreement regarding UNAMIS, the comprehensive provisions of which extend beyond mission personnel to United Nations offices, funds and programmes that are carrying out functions in relation to its tasks. The status of mission agreement has made a wide range of preparatory activities possible in the areas controlled by the Government of the Sudan. The next step for the Mission is to carry out similar preparatory activities in areas controlled by SPLM/A. Despite the work completed to date by UNAMIS, much preparatory work remains to be done in view of the extraordinary logistical challenges encountered owing to the size of the Sudan and the lack of infrastructure in many areas.

B. Role in Darfur

9. As a response to the grave developments in Darfur, the Security Council assigned additional tasks to the special political mission in its resolution 1556 (2004) of 30 July 2004. In addition to requesting a monthly report on the Government's implementation of commitments vis-à-vis the Janjaweed militias and their leaders, the Council also requested me to incorporate into the mission contingency planning for the Darfur region, including by assisting the African Union with planning and assessments for its mission in Darfur and by preparing to support the implementation of a future agreement in Darfur in close cooperation with the African Union. Accordingly, the mission has initiated such contingency planning. In its resolution 1564 (2004) of 18 September 2004, the Council subsequently requested that I take appropriate steps to increase the number of human rights monitors deployed in Darfur. As a result of those developments, my Special Representative and UNAMIS have been deeply engaged in Darfur over the past months, particularly in supporting the African Union and the African Mission in the Sudan by, inter alia, participating in the African Union-mediated Abuja peace talks and establishing a United Nations assistance cell in Addis Ababa, which is supporting the African Union Commission at the strategic level as it deploys and manages the African Mission in the Sudan.

10. The African Union and the African Mission in the Sudan must be commended for their work in Darfur, carried out under increasingly challenging circumstances and with limited resources. While we expect that the Naivasha talks will have a positive impact on the conflict there, it is clear that the African Union, and the African Mission in the Sudan in particular, will continue to play a critical role in peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in this region of the Sudan.

III. Comprehensive Peace Agreement

11. While the Comprehensive Peace Agreement demonstrates a strong sense of national ownership, and, as reflected in the pages of the protocols and agreements, the parties will be responsible for its implementation, it also specifies numerous areas in which the parties request considerable assistance and support from the United Nations and the international community. The Agreement consists of four protocols, two framework agreements and two annexes regarding the implementation modalities of the aforementioned protocols and framework agreements. The parties acknowledge in the chapeau of the Agreement that, taken together, the documents represent a concrete model for solving the wider problem of conflict within the country and that, should it be successfully implemented, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will provide a model of good governance in the Sudan that will help to create a solid basis for the preservation of peace and will make unity appear attractive.

12. In the Machakos Protocol, signed on 20 July 2002, the parties resolved the status of state and religion and the right of self-determination for the people of southern Sudan. The parties agreed to address the root causes of the conflict and to establish a democratic system of governance in which power and wealth would be equitably shared and human rights guaranteed. While the parties established the unity of the Sudan as a priority, they decided to set up a six-and-a-half-year interim

period during which interim institutions would govern the country and international monitoring mechanisms would be established and operationalized. At the end of the period, the people of southern Sudan would vote in an internationally monitored referendum to confirm the unity of the Sudan or to vote for secession. In the implementation modalities concerning this protocol, the international community was requested to assist in the funding of a number of major political and developmental activities, such as the establishment of key political commissions, preparations for the southern referendum and plans for repatriation, resettlement, reintegration, rehabilitation and reconstruction to address the needs of those affected by the war. Also in the modalities, the international community was urged to take necessary measures in support of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its full implementation, including helping to guarantee the safeguarding of the Agreement against unilateral revocation or abrogation.

13. In the Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period, dated 25 September 2003, the parties agreed to an internationally monitored ceasefire that was to come into effect once the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed. International monitoring and assistance would include the monitoring and verification of a large number of military personnel, including the redeployments of the parties' respective armed forces and the monitoring of some 39,000 military personnel within joint/integrated units. The parties also agreed to implement disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes with the assistance of the international community that would include the demobilization of considerable numbers of both armies as well as of other armed groups. The subsequent Agreement on Permanent Ceasefire and Security Arrangements Implementation Modalities during the Pre-Interim and Interim Periods of 31 December 2004 (the Ceasefire Agreement) details the monitoring and verification role to be played by military elements of the foreseen United Nations peace support operation, should the Security Council decide to authorize it. In addition, the Ceasefire Agreement calls for the active participation of the United Nations in a number of bodies that will be created to assist in the implementation of the Agreement. These include a Ceasefire Political Commission, a Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, Area Joint Military Committees and numerous joint military teams to be deployed throughout the area of operations. Members of the future peace support operation would chair the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the Area Joint Military Committees. The Ceasefire Agreement also calls for international assistance in a number of areas of security sector reform.

14. In the Agreement on Wealth Sharing during the Pre-Interim and Interim Period, dated 7 January 2004, the parties agreed to create wealth-sharing mechanisms that recognized the interests and needs of the states within the Sudan. In the Agreement, international organizations are requested to assist the parties in developing and implementing a programme for capacity enhancement in the south. The parties also signalled to the international community the need for it to play a strong role in providing post-conflict construction and reconstruction assistance to the Sudan, especially in the south and other war-affected and least developed areas. The implementation modalities concerning this Agreement contain a request that international donors play a large part in funding the various national commissions and mechanisms to be created in the implementation period, including on land issues, oil production, fiscal monitoring, managing the transition, banking and

currency and the monitoring and management of reconstruction and development funds.

15. In the Protocol on Power Sharing, signed on 26 May 2004, the parties agreed to establish a Government of National Unity. They also agreed to power-sharing arrangements inspired by the need for democracy, respect for human rights, justice, devolution of powers to the states and to the government of southern Sudan, good governance at all levels and a national Government vested with appropriate powers to act in the interests of all Sudanese people. The Protocol outlines the different layers of government as well as their composition and plans for general elections at all levels of government to be completed by the end of the third year of the interim period. International observers are requested to participate in the observation of elections, and the implementation modalities concerning the agreement list the "international community" as an executing body for all elections throughout the Sudan. The preparations and execution of the elections will require significant effort on the part of the international community.

16. In the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States of 26 May 2004, the parties reached understanding on matters related to administration, popular consultation and other issues in respect of the two conflict areas. In the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area of 26 May 2004, the parties agreed to the administration and mechanism for a referendum in the Abyei area. The parties agreed that international monitors would be deployed to Abyei to ensure full implementation of the agreements. In both protocols, the international community was requested to assist in the funding of a number of key commissions and economic programmes.

17. In the Nairobi Declaration on the Final Phase of Peace in the Sudan of 5 June 2004, which marked the beginning of the final phase of the peace negotiations, the parties jointly appealed to the regional and international community to make available resources for the programmes and activities that were urgently needed for the transition to peace.

18. In the chapeau of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the parties jointly appealed to the regional and international communities and called upon organizations and States that had been requested to witness the signing of the Agreement to provide and affirm their unwavering support for the implementation of the Agreement and to make available resources for the programmes and activities that were urgently needed for the transition to peace.

IV. Risks and challenges

19. The international community is unanimous in its desire to see peace prevail in the Sudan. But it must also be aware that assisting the Sudanese parties in overcoming their differences during peace implementation will require time and patience, as well as considerable resources and perseverance. Harmonizing all aspects of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement will be a hugely complex task, between the requirements of ceasefire and security arrangements, wealth sharing, power sharing and the future administration of the areas in the centre of the country.

20. Daunting challenges await the parties and those assisting them in implementing the protocols and agreements. Some grey areas and potentially

difficult issues remain where the parties may have differing interpretations of the texts that could prove controversial at a later stage. Some complicated issues have been left for the Presidency to decide and some decisions have been deferred to a later date. The creation of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission, the body that will monitor implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, as provided for in the Machakos Protocol, has been delayed until the adoption of the Interim National Constitution and the establishment of the Presidency. Also, the government of southern Sudan faces the challenge of raising funds from foreign and local sources to pay for its army and to achieve proportional downsizing.

21. At the same time, political solutions will have to be found for other marginalized and unstable regions such as Darfur and other areas. Regional and federal political, legal and security arrangements will need to be congruent and coordinated, as well as synchronized. Overall, the implementation of the peace agreement will radically alter the political, economic and social landscape of the country. The stakes and tasks are enormous for both the Sudanese people and the parties.

22. The United Nations and its international partners must expect to face critical times as they assist the parties in implementing the peace accord. Sudan has proved, in places, to be a dangerous operating environment, and during the pre-interim and interim periods there may at times be increased security risks arising from the initially destabilizing effects of implementing the peace agreement. Tension may be expected around certain key events in the interim period, such as midterm elections and the referendums. The integration of other armed groups in both the north and the south will be yet another considerable challenge, to be carried out in good faith and in a speedy fashion with support from the international community. In addition, there is a chance of further violence as a result of threats posed by dissatisfied or disaffected armed groups or militias unwilling to subscribe to either of the two main parties. The process of reconciling these armed groups and militias with the Government of the Sudan or SPLM/A is not detailed in the peace agreement.

23. In the south, the transition will affect certain elements now at the centre of power. The introduction of democratic principles, the rule of law, large-scale relocations and downsizing of the military is likely to threaten the authority of individuals who have enjoyed access to power. Also, internal divisions and tensions that have thus far been suppressed in the name of unity against the north could resurface. SPLM/A may face internal challenges in adopting commonly acceptable policies, easing old regional rivalries, fulfilling political and socio-economic expectations of its combatants and leaders and addressing the requests of its Leadership Council. SPLM/A will also have to engage with southern constituencies forming the south-south dialogue to jointly discuss the creation of southern institutions and public policies and to forge a shared vision for southern Sudan in line with the peace agreement. As early as possible following the signing of the Agreement, the South Sudan Defence Force (a coalition of southern factions) will need to receive proven assurances that the south-south dialogue will be carried out in good faith and will result in a fair share of political and socio-economic power.

24. In the north, traditional power structures will have to shift to accommodate the new alignment. Conflicts also exist between the Government and armed groups in Darfur, as well as in the eastern (Beja) and northern regions. Rogue elements are also actively destabilizing the security situation both in the south and in Darfur.

There will be many internal spoiler elements throughout the Sudan that have an interest in undermining the peace accord and destabilizing the regime. There is also a danger that the Sudan could become a theatre for external forces seeking to influence the implementation process for parochial advantage or bidding for large economic gains. The presence of the Lord's Resistance Army in Eastern Equatoria will continue to be a threat to peace in southern Sudan and to the safety of international forces.

25. To avoid or minimize these risks, strong and concerted strategies at both the national and international levels are required. The Sudanese leadership, in collaboration with the international community, will need to identify ways to prevent competing interests from derailing the process. To promote the inclusive implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the new Sudanese leadership will have to promote its acceptance beyond its immediate constituencies to the wider body politic and civil society. The new Government must take the lead, with the help of the international community, in starting to restore confidence and reconciliation in an all-inclusive national process. In this connection, I welcome the parties' recent engagement with a broad spectrum of the opposition, since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to begin developing a consensus on peace implementation. I also strongly support the convening of an all-inclusive national conference to discuss future governance in the Sudan, to be articulated in the national constitution and federal arrangements. The United Nations and its international partners will support the parties in the preparations and convening of this conference, for which it will be important to ensure broad participation and a mutually agreed agenda. Throughout the following period, the United Nations will continue to encourage the Government to adopt a coherent and consistent national formula that addresses the root causes of the various conflicts, based on free, full and meaningful participation.

V. Humanitarian and development considerations

26. In the meantime, the scale of humanitarian needs will remain enormous in much of the Sudan, particularly in Darfur, but also in many parts of the south and east of the country. In Darfur alone, some 2.5 million people are expected to need humanitarian assistance in 2005, including more than 1.6 million internally displaced persons. Other areas of the country, especially those where fighting between militias continues, will also continue to require humanitarian assistance for the time being. In addition, it is believed that the majority of the up to 3.2 million southern Sudanese who have fled their homes over the past two decades are intending to return once the situation allows. The key priorities for humanitarian action in 2005 thus include life-saving and protection support for 2.5 million people in Darfur; the provision of humanitarian aid to conflict-related areas of the south; the stabilization of other conflict-affected or threatened areas, particularly in the east of the country; and programmes that will assist in the return of internally displaced persons and refugees by providing humanitarian assistance in the course of their return and reintegration and recovery support in their areas of origin.

27. It will also be critical for the international community in the Sudan to take a long-term perspective with regard to assistance and for national resources to be channelled towards comprehensive development, upon which a lasting peace can be based. Decades of conflict have resulted in the deterioration of the country's human

and natural resource endowments. This has triggered or aggravated conflict among different population groups and has in turn been made more acute as a result of conflict. Ensuring a transition from humanitarian assistance to recovery and rehabilitation and from there to sustainable development will be critical for the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

VI. Proposed United Nations peace support operation in the Sudan

A. Mandate

28. As envisaged in the relevant Security Council resolutions and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, I recommend the establishment, under Chapter VI of the Charter, of a multidimensional United Nations peace support operation, the United Nations Mission in the Sudan. The mission's main tasks would include the following:

Good offices and political support for the peace process

- To support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005 and to carry out responsibilities of the United Nations outlined in the Agreement
- To assist the Government of National Unity and the government of southern Sudan to promote understanding of the peace process and the role a United Nations peace support operation would play among local communities and the parties through an effective public information capacity
- Support the Assessment and Evaluation Commission in the implementation of its mandate, including in regard to making unity appear attractive
- To cooperate with and support the efforts of the African Union, especially with regard to the Abuja peace process and the African Mission in the Sudan
- To promote and support efforts to resolve ongoing conflicts in the Sudan, especially in Darfur

Security aspects

- To monitor adherence to the Ceasefire Agreement of 31 December 2004 in accordance with its provisions
- To ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and facilitate the operations of its partners in that respect
- To take action necessary to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence within the capability of United Nations formed military units

Governance

- To provide assistance to the government of southern Sudan in the development of a civil administration

- To advise and assist Sudanese law enforcement authorities and other criminal justice institutions and facilitate bilateral and multilateral assistance in this regard, as appropriate and required by the parties
- To advise and assist in the development of a reformed police service in the Sudan
- To promote national reconciliation throughout the country
- To support the development of a culture of peace in the Sudan, including through the mass media, education and community-based approaches
- To foster the mainstreaming of gender issues into the work of the United Nations and its partners
- To assist the Government of National Unity and the government of southern Sudan with the preparations for and conduct of elections and referendums and to assist in the implementation of their results
- To establish a strong human rights monitoring presence in Darfur and to monitor and report on the human rights situation throughout the Sudan and act on abuses of human rights in cooperation with national and local authorities; and to provide training and build capacity in the field of human rights so as to improve the authorities' ability to ensure the human rights of citizens

Humanitarian assistance and development

- To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to all persons in the Sudan who need it, irrespective of ethnicity, gender and political affiliation
- To support the safe and sustainable return of Sudanese internally displaced persons and refugees
- To support the provision of assistance and protection in the Sudan for refugees from other countries
- To enhance and support the protection of civilians in armed conflict in the Sudan, in accordance with resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000)
- To assist the national and regional demobilization, disarmament and reintegration structures in the national programme and help to build the capacity of those structures
- To assist Sudanese actors in developing a national mine action programme to identify and clear mines and unexploded ordnance
- To support the Sudanese authorities and civil society in the development of a comprehensive, community-based recovery and reintegration programme in conflict-affected areas
- To mobilize resources and support for both immediate assistance and the long-term economic development of the Sudan

29. It is anticipated that the mandate of the peace support operation would last approximately seven years, including the pre-interim and interim periods, followed by an appropriate phase-out period during which the mission would support implementation of the results of the referendum.

B. A unified approach to United Nations support for the peace process

30. During the pre-interim and interim periods, all United Nations activity in the Sudan will be aimed at supporting the Sudanese people in establishing a peaceful and democratic Sudan where all citizens will live in conditions of greater dignity and security. In my report of 3 June 2004 (S/2004/453), I stressed the importance of unity of effort within the United Nations common system in order to successfully address the tasks ahead, and said that it would not be possible to facilitate the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement without a joint integrated strategy among the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations. In this regard, the peace support operation, whose tasks and functions would derive principally from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, will collaborate closely with the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in pursuit of the overall objective of the United Nations.

31. This unified approach would not alter the traditional relationship between the mission's activities and the work of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. Such bodies would continue to implement their respective mandates in the Sudan within an overall and agreed framework developed under the leadership of my Special Representative. A clear distinction would be maintained between the coordinating role of the mission and the implementation responsibilities of agencies, funds and programmes.

32. In the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, specific references are made to a number of areas in which broad international support, in particular funding, will be critical. These include security sector reform; demobilization, disarmament and reintegration; and electoral assistance. With the authority of the Council and the requisite expertise in the mission, my Special Representative would be well-positioned to maintain a strategic grasp of progress and problems in peace implementation, to effectively promote efforts to fill any gaps, including by coordinating the international response, and to exercise his good offices in order to help overcome possible political differences. Success will depend upon lead donors in each of these areas, who will need to work systematically with the United Nations system.

C. Mission structure

33. The United Nations Mission in the Sudan would therefore be a multidimensional peace support operation with a wide range of components, many of which would work closely with the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes already operating in the Sudan, as well as with bilateral donors and their institutions. In heading the mission, my Special Representative would also continue to lead the United Nations unified approach to the Sudan and would ensure that the efforts of the different elements of the United Nations system were mutually reinforcing and complementary. In this regard, he would have authority over all United Nations entities in the field, providing overall management and policy guidance and coordinating all United Nations activities throughout the country, in accordance with established United Nations policy and Security Council resolutions 1547 (2004) and 1574 (2004).

34. In view of the expected size of the mission and the breadth of functions and tasks it would address, my Special Representative would be assisted by two Deputy Special Representatives, who are also already part of the senior leadership of UNAMIS. While the management of responsibilities should be flexible, respecting the need for cross-cutting consultations and cooperation among the senior management team as well as between all components of the mission, each deputy would have his or her distinct area of responsibility. The principal deputy would work closely with my Special Representative in addressing matters regarding good offices and political support for the peace process and governance. The other deputy would continue to act as Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan and would deal with assistance matters. He is also responsible for ensuring harmonious relations with the Government and donors on matters regarding international assistance, as well as the coherent overall strategic direction of the unified United Nations country team. The senior leadership of the mission would also include a Force Commander, responsible for those elements of the mission related to the deployment, operation and support of United Nations military personnel across the Sudan. The Force Commander, who is already in theatre as the Chief Military Adviser of UNAMIS, would report directly to my Special Representative.

35. An operation of the envisaged scope and size would require a certain degree of decentralization. Therefore, the mission area would include six distinct sectors, each headed by a civilian sector director supported by a sector commander in charge of all military personnel. The geographical location of the sectors would be as follows:

- Sector I: the Equatoria area, including the states of West Equatoria, Bahr Al Jabal and East Equatoria; the sector headquarters would be located in Juba
- Sector II: the Bahr el Ghazal area, including the states of West Bahr el Ghazal, North Bahr el Ghazal, Warab and Al Buhairat; the sector headquarters would be located in Wau
- Sector III: the Upper Nile area, including the states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile; the sector headquarters would be located in Malakal
- Sector IV: the Nuba Mountains area, which would have the same boundaries of former Southern Kordofan Province when Greater Kordofan was subdivided into two provinces; the sector headquarters would be located in Kadugli
- Sector V: Southern Blue Nile, which is in Blue Nile State; the sector headquarters would be located in Damazin
- Sector VI: the Abyei area; the sector headquarters would be located in Abyei

36. Deploying and sustaining the mission would be a considerable challenge in a country the size of Western Europe and an area of responsibility measuring approximately 1,250 by 1,000 kilometres and having poor communications, few hardened roads or runways and an inoperable railway system. Viable transport links are further restricted during the rainy season, from May to November. There is also expected to be considerable risk that groups not party to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement may seek to violently disrupt the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement in addition to criminal elements who may seek to target the United Nations for theft or other destabilizing activity. There are also uncharted landmines and widespread unexploded ordnance throughout the area of responsibility. The

sectors themselves would be of significant dimensions. Sector I, for example, would be the size of Austria and sector II would be the size of New York State.

37. While the mission's headquarters would be based in Khartoum, a special office would be established in Rumbek, which would relocate should the government of southern Sudan decide to move its capital to another location. This office would be charged with working with the government of southern Sudan, as well as with managing the peace support operation, including policy formulation and planning in the south. Pending a final decision on the mission's management structure for the interim period, at least one of the four members of the mission's senior leadership (namely, my Special Representative, his two deputies and the Force Commander) would be present at all times in southern Sudan. In addition to the sectors and offices mentioned above, the mission would maintain offices in Darfur and in Kassala, in eastern Sudan, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1574 (2004). Mission headquarters in Khartoum would support a joint operations centre and a joint mission analysis cell.

38. To carry out the proposed mandate, the mission would include components focusing on four broad areas of engagement: good offices and political support for the peace process, security, governance and assistance. Good offices and political support for the peace process would be addressed by my Special Representative, as well as political affairs and public information components. Security aspects would be addressed by a military component. Governance would be addressed by the civilian police, rule of law, human rights, civil affairs, electoral assistance and gender components. Humanitarian and development assistance would be addressed by components for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; humanitarian coordination; protection; recovery, return and reintegration; and mine action. The peace support operation would also include a mission support component and an integrated security management structure. In addition, HIV and personnel conduct units would provide mission-wide advice and training.

39. In addition, there would be considerable collaboration and coordination between those components of the peace support operation whose activities related to security sector reform. While it would be ideal for a lead donor to identify itself for this activity, the mission would be well-positioned to coordinate overall international efforts in this critical area, as appropriate, working closely with such a lead donor.

D. Political component

40. The political affairs component of the mission would support my Special Representative and the United Nations operation as a whole through the provision of political advice, reporting, analysis and assessment and secretariat support as required for United Nations involvement in numerous bodies created to monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Among those bodies, my Special Representative or his deputy would serve on the Ceasefire Political Commission, which, inter alia, would provide a political forum for continuous dialogue between the parties and the international community. In addition, the component would monitor and report on political, civil, social, economic and other relevant developments throughout the country, which could have an impact on the implementation of the mission's mandate.

41. The political affairs component would also assist my Special Representative and the senior management of the peace support operation in their contacts with Sudanese authorities and political parties and maintain regular liaison and work in close collaboration with relevant partners and stakeholders, including the African Union, IGAD, the diplomatic community and United Nations political offices in the region. It would also assist in fulfilling the mission's operational and other regular reporting requirements.

E. Public information

42. The public information component of the mission would seek to offer a clear, impartial, reliable and credible voice and information source for all stakeholders in the peace process. The component would further assist the Government of National Unity and the government of southern Sudan by providing an effective information capacity, including through local and national radio, television and newspaper outlets, in order to promote understanding of the peace process and the role a United Nations peace support operation would play among local communities and the parties.

43. In order to expand the reach of the United Nations public information campaign and ensure that non-partisan information is available countrywide, a United Nations radio broadcasting service would be established that would cover all areas of the operation.

44. The public information component would also act in coordination with other mission components to create a platform for intra-community dialogue as well as dialogue between the authorities at all levels and the people. This would provide a safe environment in which community members could debate and discuss, among themselves and with their leaders, issues relevant to their daily lives.

F. Military component

45. The peace support operation would deploy its military component to monitor and verify the Ceasefire Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Such deployment would involve considerable logistical challenges given the size of the area of operation, the minimal existing infrastructure and the security challenges described above.

46. In the context of this extremely challenging environment, the main tasks of the military component would be:

(a) To monitor and verify lines of disengagement;

(b) To monitor and verify assembly areas and redeployment of forces north and south of the 1-1-56 boundary;

(c) To monitor and verify the formation of the joint/integrated units,

(d) To maintain liaison with the parties;

(e) To protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel;

(f) To protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capability;

(g) To assist, within its capability, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process;

(h) To support, within its capability, the activities of United Nations programmes;

(i) To coordinate with and, if requested, advise, the African Mission in the Sudan.

47. As described above, the military component would actively participate in and support the following bodies established by the Ceasefire Agreement to assist in its implementation: the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee, the Area Joint Military Committees and the joint military teams. The Force Commander would chair the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee and the sector commanders would chair the area joint military committees in their respective sectors. An observer from the United Nations would also be a member of the Other Armed Groups Collaborative Committee set up, according to the Ceasefire Agreement, to deal with the question of the various armed groups existing outside of the structures of the two main parties.

48. To perform those tasks, the military component would comprise the following elements:

(a) A force headquarters in Khartoum that would provide operational command and control for the military component based in Khartoum and throughout the mission's area of operations;

(b) Six sector headquarters deployed to the areas outlined above;

(c) A Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office to support the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee;

(d) A Redeployment Coordination Headquarters, located in eastern Sudan, responsible for monitoring the redeployment of troops in the area;

(e) Units that would support the deployed military units as well as other elements of the mission, such as a military police company, a heavy cargo transport company, a riverine unit, a bridging unit, aviation units, hospitals levels II and III, a well-drilling company, a signals company, air load teams, air medical evacuation teams and a petroleum platoon and movement control unit;

(f) A battalion-strength decentralized force reserve, headquartered in Kadugli, with companies garrisoned in Juba, Malakal and Wau.

49. In addition to the sector headquarters, which would accommodate both military and civilian personnel, there would be two to four permanent team sites in each sector where combined observer groups would be deployed. Each sector would also have the capability of establishing a temporary team site in support of mission requirements. Observer groups would comprise between 30 and 50 military observers, an infantry company to protect the mission's personnel and assets, a limited medical capacity and other support elements.

50. Upon receiving its mandate, the peace support operation, through its military component, would also assume operational control over two existing international

monitoring mechanisms for a period of three months: the Joint Military Commission and the Verification and Monitoring Team. This arrangement would continue for a period of three months, although an extension may be required to ensure a smooth transition to full absorption of those activities by the mission.

51. The military component would also provide advice and assistance to the Joint Defence Board in the area of security sector reform. While much of this task, particularly the restructuring and training of the two armed forces and the joint/integrated units, would require initiatives from lead donors, the military component, through liaison with the joint/integrated units and lead donors, would verify that the restructured units were regular, professional and non-partisan armed forces and that they respected the rule of law, civilian government, democracy, basic human rights and the will of the people.

52. In order to be able to perform the proposed tasks, a deployment of 10,130 military personnel would be required, of whom 750 would be military observers and 160 staff officers, enabling the formation of units comprising up to 5,070 troops and a force protection component of 4,150. It is envisaged that they would be deployed in phases, as set out in the annex.

G. Civilian police

53. In view of the parties' request for assistance from the international community in the areas of training and the establishment and capacity-building of police and other law enforcement agencies for the sustenance of peace and the rule of law, the primary objective of a civilian police component would be to assist in the development of a transparent police service, as described in the Machakos Protocol and other agreements. In many areas, the existing police force is a paramilitary hierarchical organization without accountability to the community or independent oversight. In five locations in the south, approximately 17,000 former government police remain deployed as well as the emergent police force derived from the Sudan People's Liberation Army. The police forces are in need of assistance and restructuring if they are to achieve internationally acceptable standards of operation to meet the challenges of the post-war environment. As such, the civilian police component would also help to coordinate relevant support initiatives of other bilateral and international donors.

54. The civilian police component of the mission would work in close collaboration with bilateral international partners to advise and assist existing government police structures and the SPLM/A police force as they re-examined their roles and functions and reviewed their methods of operation to move away from military-style policing, which evolved in wartime, towards a style involving direct interaction with the community. To do this, the civilian police component would monitor the delivery of services by the local police to establish a detailed picture of police activities as well as community expectations for policing. This approach would help the parties to identify priority activities, establish a baseline of available resources and needs and provide a consolidated assessment of the impact of external input. The civilian police component of the peace support operation would also be directly involved in specific capacity-building areas such as training and the design of programmes within the wider context of security sector reform. All efforts of the restructuring and the development of the police would be based on

the principles of the Machakos Protocol and the full engagement of the relevant authorities.

55. To perform the proposed tasks, the deployment of up to 755 international civilian police officers would be required. Of those, approximately 108 civilian police personnel would be senior-grade officers able to effectively command a self-contained unit, whether at the field or the headquarters level; 244 would be middle-grade officers to be deployed as commanders or team leaders at a lower level or as managers throughout the sectors and team sites; and the remaining 403 would be junior-grade officers who would undertake the majority of the research, monitoring, mentoring, inspection, training and administrative duties. It is envisaged that they would be deployed in phases, as set out in the annex.

H. Rule of law

56. The rule of law component would ensure that the peace support operation was able to work closely with other international partners to support the establishment and operation of essential legislative, executive and judicial institutions of the Government of National Unity as well as the government of southern Sudan. Accordingly, the rule of law component would offer good offices, advice and technical assistance to support key processes in a number of areas, including constitutional development and the strengthening of legislative, judicial and correctional institutions and systems.

57. The rule of law component would also contribute directly to United Nations support for security sector reform, particularly in two areas. First, the component would support national actors in strengthening the independence, impartiality and efficiency of the judiciary and enhance the fairness and effectiveness of the legal system in accordance with the Sudan's own legal traditions and cultures and international norms. This activity would be complemented by the work of the mission's proposed human rights component, described below, which would promote the development of a judicial system based on democratic principles and international human rights standards. Second, the rule of law component would contribute to security sector reform by undertaking a coordinating, advisory and training role aimed at improving the prison system in areas of southern Sudan, which are currently unable to contribute to the maintenance of community security. The United Nations is well-placed to address this second area, considering the proposed activities of the mission's civilian police component and the link between an effective national police and a functioning prison system.

I. Human rights

58. The human rights component of the peace support operation would work with the parties to develop and strengthen national and local capacity for the protection and promotion of human rights, including the development of an independent and effective national Human Rights Commission, which would be of particular importance.

59. The human rights component, working closely with the rule of law component and other international partners, would also assist national stakeholders in the development of a transitional justice strategy in accordance with the lessons learned

and experience identified in my report on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616).

60. Allegations of human rights violations by any party can jeopardize the peace process. Impartial observation by human rights officers working throughout the mission's area of responsibility would assist the national and local authorities in acting on abuses and preventing their recurrence.

61. In Darfur, international monitoring and investigation of human rights violations remains essential, together with the pursuit of effective remedies for victims. The peace support operation would include a significant human rights presence in Darfur, engaging with the justice system and collaborating with the African Mission in the Sudan to monitor efforts to address human rights crimes.

J. Civil affairs

62. The civil affairs component would work to assist and facilitate the reconciliation process at the grass-roots level and support the establishment of a culture of peace for all sections of civil society. The component would work closely with local non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations to promote local ownership of the peace protocols, encourage dialogue between the authorities and civil society and support efforts to establish public administration. The civil affairs component would support political activities related to ending violent conflict in Darfur, preventing the eruption of conflict in the eastern region and supporting post-settlement peacebuilding in southern Sudan and the conflict areas.

63. Civil affairs programmes would focus on local actors, and formal cooperation arrangements would be established with universities, faith-based organizations, local civil society organizations and other institutions supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. At the operational level, activities would concentrate on conflict analysis and reconciliation. Civil affairs officers would provide operational and other regular reporting from the field.

64. As the population in much of the mission's area of responsibility would be grappling with challenges caused by rudimentary infrastructure, emerging administrative services and weak institutions, assistance from the mission's civil affairs component should be easily accessible to the civilian population, in particular in southern Sudan. In addition to being present in all sectors and field offices, civil affairs officers would monitor and support civilian activities arising from the peace agreement through the deployment of mobile teams working closely with military colleagues. Furthermore, the component would launch a pilot programme to train and deploy national staff to selected institutions lending direct support to structures established under the peace agreement.

K. Electoral assistance

65. The mission's electoral assistance component would assist the Referendum Commission, in cooperation with relevant international partners, with the early preparations for the southern Sudan referendum with a view to ensuring its transparency, fairness and legitimacy.

66. During the interim period, mechanisms for participatory governance throughout the Sudan should be established and consolidated. General and presidential elections, along with a series of referendums for the regions, would take place from the third year and no later than the end of the fourth year of this period, in order to establish properly mandated executive, judicial and legislative institutions at the federal, state and local levels. In the various protocols and agreements, the parties have requested international monitoring for the electoral processes. For that purpose, the mission, in close coordination with its international partners, would provide support, as requested and needed, to the National Electoral Commission, which is in charge of the organization and conduct of elections.

67. In addition to those specific activities, the peace support operation would assist in the creation of an enabling context for all planned elections and referendums. The mission would proceed with the deployment of its electoral staff in phases, in accordance with an agreed electoral timetable and technical requirements identified on the ground. The electoral assistance component would provide, as needed, advice and technical assistance to the National Electoral Commission and other relevant authorities in such areas as electoral administration and planning, review of electoral laws and regulations, training of election officials, coordination of donor assistance and voter and civic education. Its activities would further include support for the increased participation of women, both as voters and as candidates, and for the further development of a national voter registry. The component would also provide logistical support to international election observers and coordinate that support.

L. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

68. While precise figures are not yet available, the overall number of persons required to disarm, according to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, is expected to be high. It includes combatants affected by force downsizing, armed groups allied to the signatories of the agreement and foreign-armed groups. The parties have agreed to a broad disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme, led by recognized State institutions and sustained through cooperation and coordination with local and international partners. Special emphasis has been put on demobilizing child soldiers within six months of the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. For the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme to succeed, a wide spectrum of Sudanese society must be given a genuine role in the programme, which would also need to cater to the specific needs of women combatants, supporters and dependants, as well as demobilizing children.

69. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration component would bring together relevant United Nations agencies and build upon existing experience and expertise in the country to provide technical, financial and logistical support to assist the parties in designing, implementing and monitoring a national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme for all armed groups, as well as assisting the Sudanese to develop comprehensive small arms management strategies to address the issue of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country. Its activities would be coordinated with other implementing partners. The component would include a programme support unit, a monitoring and evaluation unit and a community sensitization unit, and its staff would be deployed at the subnational, state and community levels in order to coordinate with and

support the work of the respective Sudanese disarmament, demobilization and reintegration institutions.

70. In accordance with the Ceasefire Agreement, the role of international partners should be supportive and focus on facilitating, coordinating and extending technical assistance throughout the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and the transition from war to peace. This can succeed only with sustained and committed support, and I believe it would be useful if a Member State would identify itself as a lead donor for this activity. As discussed in paragraph 80 below, to ensure the success of this crucial aspect of peace consolidation, the mission would require start-up funds for reintegration.

M. Humanitarian assistance coordination

71. Given the tremendous humanitarian needs in many parts of the country, the United Nations will have a vital responsibility to provide a strong and well-managed humanitarian assistance programme as long as urgent humanitarian needs have to be met. This will be critical for the success of the peace process and for the prospects of resolving ongoing and threatened conflicts. In operational terms, the United Nations would carry out this humanitarian assistance role primarily through the programmes included in the United Nations work plan for 2005 and its successors.

72. The overall coordination and management of the humanitarian relief operations throughout the Sudan would be a key task of the unified peace support operation. In his capacity as Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan, the Deputy Special Representative would be responsible for coordinating the humanitarian response through the United Nations country team. He would be supported by two deputies for the north and the south, and would supervise the work of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which would remain institutionally separate from the mission and be supported by voluntary contributions. While the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs would carry out the bulk of the work related to day-to-day humanitarian coordination, the Deputy Special Representative would be supported by additional staff from within the mission who would ensure a close linkage between humanitarian and other critical United Nations activities, such as demobilization. The humanitarian coordination component would also ensure that humanitarian activities were fully complementary with an effective protection programme and longer-term sustainable development activities so that humanitarian assistance could be phased out at an appropriate moment. Effective resource mobilization, particularly of the $1.2 billion required for humanitarian activities under the work plan for 2005, would also be a key activity of the component.

73. In order to help implement the humanitarian component of the work plan, inclusive coordination mechanisms would be established with Sudanese authorities, donors and non-governmental organizations that would promote joint assessment, analysis and planning. The humanitarian assistance component must also help to ensure access to vulnerable populations and would manage, through the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, a humanitarian information service in key areas of the country, especially in Darfur and southern Sudan.

N. Protection

74. Protecting civilian populations suffering from the effects of conflicts is a key element in stabilizing peace in the Sudan and in providing an increased measure of security to its people. During the pre-interim and interim periods, the Government of National Unity and the government of southern Sudan bear the primary responsibility for the protection of civilians in areas under their control, as armed groups in control of territory are responsible for those civilians within it. The protection component of the peace support operation would coordinate United Nations efforts to support the parties as they addressed their protection obligations under applicable national and international law. In addition, the peace support operation, and the protection component in particular, would lead the protection work of the international community, both through its own operational efforts and by coordinating the work of its partners. This approach to protection draws on Security Council resolution 1296 (2000), other relevant resolutions and presidential statements and international humanitarian law.

75. The mission would develop a Sudan-wide protection strategy and work plan focusing on the protection of returning populations, host communities and those wishing to remain in situations of displacement until a durable solution can be found; civilians in armed conflict, including in Darfur and other areas where conflict may continue or erupt; and women, children and vulnerable groups of persons.

76. The mission, through its protection component, would ensure that structures were put in place to provide the support and services required for the implementation of the protection strategy by the United Nations country team. The mission would also ensure coordination and cooperation across a range of issues relevant to the provision of protection, including human rights, disarmament, demobilization, return and reintegration, the rule of law, small arms and mine action. Furthermore, the United Nations would develop specific approaches for the protection of women, children and vulnerable categories of persons, including monitoring of and protection from all forms of sexual and gender-based violence, abuse and exploitation, child abduction and slavery, as well as processes relating to the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups and armed forces within their communities. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1539 (2004) and previous resolutions, the mission would include child protection advisers.

O. Recovery, return and reintegration

77. The return of internally displaced persons and refugees to southern Sudan presents a formidable challenge to the authorities and the resident communities. The United Nations expects that between 500,000 and 1.2 million people could return in 2005 alone, in many cases through and to highly insecure areas with social infrastructure and livelihood conditions that are ranked among the lowest in the world. The pace and magnitude of assistance that is currently being provided must be stepped up to keep pace with an increasing number of returnees. The safe and dignified return of these displaced populations and their subsequent reintegration into often fragile host communities are key elements contributing to a sustainable peace and reconciliation process. The challenge is to manage the return and reintegration process in an integrated manner so that it contributes to sustainable

peace and reconciliation rather than increasing tensions and the potential for new conflict.

78. The recovery, return and reintegration component of the peace support operation would coordinate such a unified and integrated approach by the United Nations system and the broader international community. This approach would include the provision of humanitarian assistance by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in the course of the return of internally displaced persons and refugees and the coordination, by the mission, of support for their return, reintegration and recovery in their areas of origin.

79. By its presence, the peace support operation would also play a major catalytic role in establishing and maintaining the security conditions necessary for the reintegration and recovery processes. In the longer term, increasing support from bilateral donors and international financial institutions would ensure that reintegration and recovery became part of the overall reconstruction effort of the country.

80. The recovery, return and reintegration component would also be responsible for working closely with the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme in the provision of rapid initial reintegration assistance to returnees and ex-combatants. Close cooperation would also be required with the humanitarian assistance component of the mission, given the requirement to provide aid to returnees en route and to the most vulnerable once they reached their communities. In this context, the mission would require start-up funds to ensure that immediate priorities for return and reintegration were addressed.

P. Sustainable development

81. While the peace support operation per se would not have direct responsibility for sustainable development, its activities would complement ongoing work in this area, including the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals. In particular, my Special Representative and the Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator would support the joint assessment mission, which is a United Nations, World Bank, Government of Sudan and government of southern Sudan exercise to establish a framework and costing for establishing peace and moving forward on development. The programmes identified by the joint assessment mission would have to be translated into an operational plan, including implementation arrangements such as multi-donor trust funds, as stipulated in the wealth sharing agreement. Until the planned international donor conference is held in Norway and funds pledged there are received, the work plan for 2005 identifies immediate start-up transitional programmes that would support the rapid implementation of recovery and development activities in order to grasp the peace dividend.

Q. Mine action

82. Despite the fact that the Sudan is believed to be one of the countries in the world most affected by mines and unexploded ordnance, far too little is known about the scope of the problem and its impact on the local population, internally displaced persons and refugees. Prior to the beginning of the peace negotiations, it was virtually impossible to engage in mine surveys, clearing, capacity development

or even mine risk education activities. As a result, mines and unexploded ordnance constitute a major threat to large segments of the population in the proposed mission's area of responsibility and would hinder the transition to a post-conflict environment and the promotion of sustainable development activities. Very few minefields and dangerous areas are marked in the Sudan, causing large numbers of civilian deaths and injuries and excluding many roads and large areas of productive land from use. On the positive side, the Government and SPLM have signed an agreement on a national mine action strategy. In addition, the Government has signed and ratified the Ottawa Mine Ban Convention and SPLM has signed a deed of commitment in Geneva, matching the obligations underlined in the Ottawa Convention.

83. The mission's mine action component would lead a United Nations mine action programme in cooperation with the Government of National Unity and the government of southern Sudan. United Nations agencies, funds and programmes would contribute to the overall effort by building on existing programmes, including the United Nations Development Programme's mine action capacity development work and the United Nations Children's Fund's mine risk education and capacity development activities, with the Sudanese authorities and national organizations. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the World Food Programme would also contribute to the overall programme, which would focus on clearing key routes and developing sustainable national capacity.

R. Gender

84. In accordance with Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), the mission would implement a plan of action to guide the process of gender mainstreaming in all aspects of its work. The long years of war have compounded gender inequalities in the socio-political and economic spheres and have escalated the scale and incidence of gender-based violence, as well as impunity for such crimes. A sustainable basis for the peace process therefore requires investments in upholding and protecting the equal rights of women and men. The mission would provide support to the Government of National Unity, the government of southern Sudan and the people of the Sudan to facilitate the implementation of policies and programmes to advance gender equality goals through the inputs of a well-resourced gender component.

85. A key objective of the work of the mission's gender component would be to facilitate capacity-building support for both uniformed and civilian elements in the mission on gender mainstreaming strategies. As part of that process, wide-scale gender training activities would be implemented on an ongoing basis for all staff. Specific training highlighting the obligations and responsibilities of staff in upholding standards of conduct that prevent sexual exploitation and abuse would be a part of this effort.

86. A gender action plan specifically targeted to the Darfur emergency would also be implemented and would focus on prevention and response measures to address the high rate of reported incidents of sexual and gender-based violence. Addressing HIV/AIDS prevention as part of this effort would also be emphasized.

S. HIV support

87. The HIV/AIDS unit would provide ongoing HIV/AIDS awareness and sensitization programmes for uniformed and civilian peacekeepers in all the sectors. The peace support mission would also collaborate closely with the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS and other United Nations agencies, non-governmental organizations and civil society-based organizations in outreach projects for vulnerable populations and would provide technical support to the national AIDS control programme.

T. Mission support

88. The mission's support division would be responsible for establishing, operating and maintaining the infrastructure and providing the essential communication, mobility and sustainment capabilities that the mission needed to carry out its responsibilities. As I have outlined in my previous reports, the sheer size of the Sudan, as well as the complete lack of economic, financial, transportation and communication infrastructure in much of the area where the mission would operate, would present huge logistical challenges. The United Nations would need to invest substantial human, material and financial resources, as well as time, in creating the essential support facilities and services while also meeting generally accepted standards of accountability. Accordingly, the build-up of the proposed peace support operation is likely to continue until October 2005, when the military component would be fully deployed.

89. Support for military units operating out of Khartoum and the six sector headquarters would follow United Nations standards for self-sustainment. Military observers, civilian police and civilian staff would be stationed in regional offices and numerous other locations throughout the area of operations in the Sudan and would need to be supported accordingly, including the provisioning of office and living accommodation, security, medical services, communications and transport. The mission would endeavour to be as self-reliant as possible, both to ensure uninterrupted operational capability and to preclude, as much as possible in each location, competition between itself and the local population for the same scarce commodities, such as fuel. In this connection, considerable effort is being placed on identifying common and integrated services across the United Nations system and, where practicable, common premises at each location where the mission and other elements of the United Nations system may be co-located. The mission is implementing specific measures to ensure the safety and security of all personnel in the mission area, including by acquiring premises that would meet or exceed minimum operating residential security standards. Owing to the serious shortage of residential housing in the south, in many places it would be necessary for the mission to provide suitable, albeit austere, living accommodations, both to its own personnel and to the staff of co-located United Nations programmes, funds and agencies until they can establish acceptable living accommodations for themselves.

90. The mobility of military observers and civilian staff would be essential for the success of the mission. In a country the size of the Sudan, substantial air assets would be required. In addition, vehicular patrols would require full freedom of movement in order to carry out their monitoring and verification tasks. As explained in the above section on mine action, the Sudan's mine problem would have a serious

detrimental effect on the freedom of movement of United Nations observers. The proactive clearance of roads by the mission would enable greater use of ground transport and decrease reliance on air support, resulting in significant cost savings. The mission therefore would require the capability to demine, reconstruct and maintain its main and feeder supply routes until long-term rehabilitation measures could be applied through the normal developmental process.

U. Integrated security management

91. During the pre-interim and interim periods, the peace support operation and the wider United Nations system could face a number of serious threats to their security, as outlined above. In order to minimize the risk to United Nations personnel while enabling them to work in a variety of security environments, an integrated security management system would be created within the peace support operation. This integrated structure would be led by my Special Representative in his capacity as designated official for all security matters for the United Nations in the Sudan and would be based on centralized country planning and policy management, complemented by robust security management support in each of the sectors.

V. Personnel conduct

92. Over the past year, the number of allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse against United Nations peacekeeping personnel has increased significantly. I am outraged at any such acts of gross misconduct, which undermine the important work of tens of thousands of United Nations peacekeepers who serve with distinction across the world. It is of the highest priority to send a clear message regarding my policy of zero tolerance for acts of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by personnel employed by or affiliated with the United Nations from the onset of a peacekeeping operation. In this regard, a personnel conduct unit would be essential in supporting my Special Representative in developing strategies and mechanisms to prevent, identify and respond to all forms of misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse. The unit would play a key role in putting in place awareness-raising and training activities to prevent misconduct, setting up networks of focal points to receive complaints, establishing related data management systems and monitoring compliance with United Nations standards of conduct. The mission would ensure that an adequate capacity to investigate allegations of personnel misconduct was in place early in the life of the mission.

W. Darfur

93. A stable Sudan requires a peaceful Darfur. In this regard, it is essential that the work of the United Nations and the African Union in the Sudan be complementary. I have initiated discussion on this critical subject with the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Alpha Oumar Konaré, which my Special Representative is continuing. In particular, the importance of maintaining strong liaison between the African Mission in the Sudan and the United Nations Mission in the Sudan at the operational, headquarters and strategic levels cannot be underestimated. The liaison

would include placing some United Nations military observers and civilian police officers, in addition to civilian staff, in field offices in Darfur. It would also require reinforcing relations between my Special Representative and African Union officials, in particular the Special Representative of the Chairperson.

94. The human rights presence authorized in resolution 1564 (2004) would be incorporated into the mission, as would a capacity for humanitarian coordination and facilitation in Darfur. The close relationship with the African Union, as described above, as well as the broader presence in Darfur, would strengthen the ability of the mission to conduct contingency planning for Darfur, as requested in Security Council resolution 1556 (2004).

VII. Observations and recommendations

95. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement marks a turning point in the history of the Sudan. It provides the parties and people with a long-awaited opportunity to bring the north-south conflict to a close and to set a course for stability, growth and development. The war's end should alleviate the humanitarian situation and facilitate the safe return of refugees and displaced persons.

96. The peaceful resolution of conflict in the Sudan has positive implications for the region and beyond. For decades, Sudanese conflicts have been both a cause and a consequence of violence and instability in neighbouring countries. Armed groups travelled back and forth across borders; conflicts within different countries became intertwined; alliances among Governments and rebel movements in the region shifted as each sought to gain advantage over others. Inevitably, it was civilians, especially the weak and vulnerable, who suffered the most. Some were repeatedly displaced and forced to flee across borders. Their tragedy put strains on recipient communities and complicated relations among Governments.

97. Sudanese strife has had a profound impact beyond the region as well. The country's instability has at times provided cover for international terrorist movements. The suffering of civilians in both the north and the south has been an affront to the global public conscience and has devoured vast financial resources in humanitarian aid. The trove of natural resources in conflict areas has intensified problems. Since the world's Governments frequently disagreed on appropriate responses to these many and varied challenges, the conflict in the Sudan distorted relations among countries near and far.

98. This long-running pernicious conflict cannot quickly or easily be dispatched to history. The parties have given themselves six and a half years to implement their agreements. The international community too must be prepared to sustain a long-term commitment. The road to lasting peace is fraught with challenges in the key areas of security, governance, the rule of law, the judiciary system, human rights, the disbanding, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups and militias, preparations for elections, return and reintegration, relief, recovery and sustainable development. Due to these political and socio-economic challenges, any effort to assist successfully in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement would require an extensive, sustained and carefully coordinated response from the United Nations and its international partners.

99. While investment in peace is always warranted, its merit could not be clearer than in the case of the Sudan. Substantial resources are required for relief and recovery, including the return, repatriation and resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees, as well as for the development activities envisaged by the joint assessment mission. Such support would be essential in helping the Sudanese to move their economy onto a sound footing. The Security Council recognized the necessity for such assistance in its resolution 1547 (2004), in which it called upon the international community to be prepared for constant engagement in the Sudan, including through extensive funding in support of peace. A reconstruction conference, which the Government of Norway has generously agreed to organize, would provide an opportunity for international resource mobilization. I would encourage individual donors to signal their readiness to become lead donors in key areas, including the reintegration of former combatants, the restructuring of the armed forces and police capacity-building. I urge Member States to fund fully the work plan for 2005 and to make their contributions early so as to allow for substantial recovery programming that can quickly demonstrate to the Sudanese people the dividends of peace.

100. While international assistance is crucial, the Sudanese alone are responsible for the success or failure of their peace process. The parties rightly feel a strong sense of propriety towards the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Its implementation would require their full commitment and good will towards each other as well as their readiness to engage in a positive and inclusive manner with all Sudanese.

101. Ultimately, peace in the Sudan is indivisible, as are international efforts to support it, including the deployment of a United Nations operation. Support to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement is the most promising path to a resolution of other political crises facing the Sudan, most notably in Darfur. Since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement emphasizes federalism, the balance of powers, democratic representation for marginal groups and good governance, its implementation would fundamentally change the relationship between the central Government and the states. Specifically, the Agreement provides for the devolution of power to the very areas where grievances have centred on exclusion from political access and economic benefit.

102. It would be impractical to wait for peace to reign throughout the Sudan before supporting the agreements that have already been reached. A start must be made in implementing the North-South Agreement and to utilize the process, as described above, to help the Sudanese resolve other conflicts as well. With this in mind, I recommend that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VI of the Charter, authorize the deployment of a multidimensional United Nations peace support operation with a mandate in line with the recommendations contained in the present report and with adequate resources, including troop strength of 10,130, including 750 military observers, 160 staff officers, enabling units comprising up to 5,070 troops, a force protection component of 4,150 and 755 civilian police.

103. As is the case with all Chapter VI peacekeeping operations, the Secretariat has held consultations with the parties on the list of potential troop-contributing countries. Despite appeals made to more than 100 Member States, the Secretariat has received a very limited number of responses. While some crucial enabling units are still required, there are just enough commitments from troop-contributing countries to initiate a phased deployment of the operation in all sectors as planned.

Upon the Security Council's approval of the recommendations contained in the present report, therefore, the United Nations would commence the deployment of the military and civilian personnel that have been made available for those tasks. I am fully confident that the planned United Nations operation, which includes contingents from countries with extensive peacekeeping experience, will be able to discharge its tasks with professionalism and impartiality. I count on the full cooperation of the parties to accept all aspects of mission planning, including full freedom of movement and the structure and composition of the military elements.

104. The international community owes a debt of gratitude to the mediators of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and especially to its Chief Mediator, Major General (retired) Lazarus Sumbeiywo. I wish to commend them, as well as their international partners, for their invaluable contribution to the cause of peace and stability in the Sudan. The IGAD success in the north-south peace process, as well as the enormous efforts now under way by the African Union in relation to Darfur, mark a positive trend towards greater African leadership in resolving Africa's conflict. Such leadership deserves to be matched with international political and material support, and I urge the provision of continued assistance to the African Union for its operational role in Darfur and its political role at the peace talks in Abuja. The Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway) and the IGAD Partners Forum should also be praised for taking a leading role in recent years in facilitating the signing of a series of framework protocols and agreements that were essential for the completion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Finally, I wish to commend my Special Representative, Mr. Pronk, for his active contribution to addressing both the north-south peace process and the situation in Darfur.

Annex

Planned deployment of military and police personnel

Phase	*Military deployment*	*Civilian police deployment*
1	Force headquarters in Khartoum to become operational. Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office to be established in support of the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee in Juba and the Redeployment Coordination Headquarters to be established in Kassala. Initial operational capability to be established in sectors I (Equatoria), III (Upper Nile) and for the Redeployment Coordination Headquarters in eastern Sudan.	Civilian police headquarters to be established in Khartoum, headed by Police Commissioner and supported by a core staff of 34. Forward operational headquarters to be established in Juba, headed by Deputy Police Commissioner and supported by a core staff of 54.
2	The Redeployment Coordination Headquarters at Kassala, Joint Monitoring and Coordination Office and Ceasefire Joint Military Committee at Juba will achieve full operating capabilities. Initial operational capability to be established in sectors II (Bahr el Ghazal), V (Blue Nile) and VI (Abyei). Joint Military Commission will be relieved by United Nations sector IV (Nuba Mountains) contingent.	Civilian police headquarters and forward operational headquarters operational. Sector headquarters to be established for all sectors with operational capability. Sector headquarters to liaise with provincial commanders to develop plans for the deployment of additional advisers and monitors.
3	Expansion of monitoring/verification tasks throughout all six sectors through establishment of team sites and the deployment of remaining United Nations military observers, protection forces and enabling units. Sectors I, III and VI to become fully operational. Force reserve battalion will be deployed.	Expansion of monitoring functions throughout the mission area of operations. Additional trainers and mentors would be deployed to expedite training activities and assist local southern Sudan police in their recruitment and selection processes.
4	Deployment completed with sectors II, V and force reserve battalion becoming fully operational.	Deployment of all 755 civilian police officers completed throughout area of operations as monitoring functions are expanded.

Note: Military and police deployment plans cover the same area of operations with the same sectors and same sector headquarters.

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The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixtieth year

Letter dated 20 January 2005 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary of Israeli violations and acts of aggression against Lebanon from 27 December 2004 until 17 January 2005, inclusive (see annex).

These grave violations are part of a series of persistent and provocative Israeli air, sea and land violations of Lebanese sovereignty, which intervene against international law, the resolutions of international legitimacy and the repeated calls of the United Nations for their cessation.

In view of the escalation of Israeli threats against Lebanon, my Government relies upon the United Nations to deter and prevent Israel from indulging in such acts and holds Israel fully responsible for any consequences, since these acts constitute a threat to international peace and security.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ibrahim **Assaf**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

05-22522 (E) 010205

Annex to the letter dated 20 January 2005 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On 27 December 2004, at 2249 hours, Israeli occupation forces positioned in Chebaa farms fired four flare shells over the farms.

On 29 December 2004, at 0040 hours, an Israeli gun boat in the Lebanese territorial water facing Ras-Naqoura fired several bursts of medium machine gunfire on the high sea.

On 31 December 2004, at 1829 hours, an Israeli gun boat in the Lebanese territorial water facing Ras-Naqoura fired several bursts of medium machine gunfire and many flare shells on the high sea.

On 1 January 2005, at 16.25 hours, an Israeli gun boat in the Lebanese territorial water facing Ras-Naqoura fired several bursts of medium machine gunfire on the high sea.

On 6 January 2005, between 1113 and 1145 hours, two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at different altitudes, entered from above the sea facing Tripoli and flew in a circular motion over Tripoli, Dahr El-Baidar, Jezzine, and Saida.

On 7 January 2005, at 0810 hours, an Israeli gun boat in the Lebanese territorial water facing Ras-Naqoura fired several bursts of medium machine gunfire; and between 2125 and 2135 hours, fired two flare shells on the high sea.

On 7 January 2005, between 1200 and 1315 hours, Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at a high altitude over Chebaa farms.

On 7 January 2005, at 1400 hours, Israeli forces fired several bursts of medium machine gunfire at a pick-up truck parked inside Lebanese territory on the outskirts of Meis-ElJabal village. The car was hit by many bullets, and the passengers who were picking up junk from the area fled the scene after the shooting stopped. No one was injured.

On 8 January 2005, at 1849 hours, an Israeli gun boat in the Lebanese territorial water facing Ras-Naqoura fired a flare shell on the high sea.

On 9 January 2005,

- Between 1240 and 1450 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude over Kfarkila, headed west, and flew in a circular motion over Kfarkila and Deir Mimas;
- Between 1345 and 1402 hours, two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at different altitudes over Aitaroun village and flew in a circular motion over Kfarkila and Deir Mimas;
- Between 1402 and 1430 hours, two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at different altitudes, entered from above the sea facing Tyre, headed east, and flew in a circular motion over Kfarkila and Deir Mimas.

On 11 January 2005,

- Between 1108 and 1125 hours, two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at different altitudes, entered from above the sea facing Jbeil, headed to Chekaa, and then headed to Tyre;
- Between 1108 and 1140 hours, two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at different altitudes, entered from above the sea facing Jbeil, headed to Beirut and Zahrani, then turned back north to Chekaa, flew in a circular motion over Chekaa, Jbeil and Becharre, and then headed south through Dahr El-Baidar and Sarafand;
- Between 1238 and 1610 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above the sea facing Saida, headed to Khalde, and flew in a circular motion over Khalde;
- Between 1810 and 2250 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above the sea facing Tyre, headed to Khalde, flew in a circular motion over Khalde and Tyre, then headed north to Jbeil, and then turned back to South Lebanon.

On 12 January 2005,

- Between 0650 and 0930 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above the sea facing Tyre and flew in a circular motion over Khalde and Naameh;
- Between 1545 and 1843 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above the sea facing Tyre, headed to Khalde and Sarafand, then headed south and flew in a circular motion over Tyre, Maarake and Nabatieh.

On 13 January 2005,

- Between 0753 and 1145 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above the sea facing Sarafand, headed north and flew in a circular motion over Saida and Sarafand;
- Between 1130 and 1617 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above the sea facing Naqoura, headed north and flew in a circular motion over Jiye, Saida and Saadiyate;
- Between 1942 and 2310 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above the sea facing Naqoura, headed north and flew in a circular motion over Beirut and South Lebanon.

On 17 January 2005,

- Between 0740 and 0930 hours, an Israel drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above Naqoura, headed to Khalde and flew in a circular motion over Saida and Zahrani;
- Between 1155 and 1335 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above Chebaa farms, headed north and flew in a circular motion over Beiteddine and Marjayoun;
- Between 1210 and 1325 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude over Saida and Zahrani;

- Between 1210 and 1500 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above Tyre, headed to Khalde and flew in a circular motion over Saida and Beiteddine;
- Between 1250 and 1310 hours, two Israeli helicopters violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude over Chebaa farms;
- At 1429 hours, Israeli occupation forces positioned in Chebaa farms fired several 155 mm artillery rounds, impacted at the outskirts of Kfarchouba, Halta, and Bastra farm;
- Between 1525 and 1718 hours, an Israeli drone plane violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude, entered from above Chebaa farms, headed north and flew in a circular motion over Jezzine and Chebaa farms;
- At 1530 hours, two Israeli helicopters violated Lebanese airspace at a medium altitude over Chebaa farms;
- At 1530 hours, Israeli warplanes raided the intersection of Alman-Aadchit Elqoussair and Deir Siriane by firing air-to-ground missiles;
- Between 1535 and 1600 hours, two Israeli warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at different altitudes, entered from above the sea facing Tyre, and flew in a circular motion over Marake, Qana and Tyre;
- Between 1735 and 1840 hours, Israeli occupation forces positioned in Chebaa farms fired several 155 mm artillery rounds, impacted at the outskirts of Chanouh village.

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Report by the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of Benin on the Security Council

1. Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 1 February 2005 from the Permanent Representative of Benin to the United Nations, stating that Ambroise Adanklounon, Denis Babaekpa, Albert Agossou, Thédore Loko, Thomas Adoumasse, Bienvenu Houngbedji, Elvire Ogouma, Grazia Eklue-Natey, Issifou Dara and Pascal Biaou have been appointed alternate representatives of Benin on the Security Council for the period 1 to 28 February 2005.

2. In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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